WASHINGTON — Boeing retaliated against two employees who were likely involved in removing the panel that flew off Alaska Airlines Flight 1282, the top U.S. aviation safety regulator said on Wednesday.
That was among the allegations levied against Boeing, its largest supplier Spirit AeroSystems and regulators during the second day of a two-day investigative hearing before the National Transportation Safety Board.
The board is attempting to determine what caused the Jan. 5 blowout, which saw a poorly installed panel explode off a nearly new 737 MAX 9.
The near disaster over Portland occurred because workers at Boeing’s Renton assembly plant failed to install four bolts. How that lapse went undetected, and how future mistakes can be corrected before they endanger other passengers, flight attendants and pilots, remains unclear.
More than 20 hours of hearings on Tuesday and Wednesday led by NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy aimed to shed light on the problems at Boeing and examine the steps the company and regulators have taken to correct them. Homendy was joined by four members of the board in probing more than a dozen witnesses, who also took questions from NTSB staff and concerned parties.
Homendy on Wednesday took issue with Boeing’s decision to move two Renton-based door crew workers to Everett. She described the reassignment as a form of retaliation, despite the company’s assertions that it will not take disciplinary action for unintentional mistakes. Those two workers, who are believed to have worked on the 737 that experienced the blowout, are now on administrative leave.
“Boeing prison”
There is no evidence that the front-line workers’ mistakes were intentional, Homendy said.
“What sort of impression does that give your employees that you sideline them?” Homendy asked Boeing quality managers during the contentious hearing. “It’s very clear they have been told they will not return, if at all, until this investigation is over. Have you communicated why that is?”
Boeing executives testifying Wednesday said they did not have knowledge of the situation.
Workplace retaliation came up several other times during the hearings, following similar accusations that Boeing has faced for years.
The company has long been accused of striking back against whistleblowers, including those who came forward after two fatal 737 MAX crashes that killed 346 people in 2018 and 2019.
Since the January blowout, , alleging safety concerns with how Boeing planes are manufactured and how the company handles employees who raise an alarm. The Federal Aviation Administration said it has seen increased use of its whistleblower hotline by Boeing employees, as well as workers from Spirit AeroSystems, which builds the 737 MAX fuselage.
The NTSB found in interviews that employees were afraid to raise concerns out of fear the company would reassign them. One of the reassigned door crew employees described their new posting in Everett as a “cage” and “Boeing prison.”
Boeing is improving channels for employees to report concerns, including updating its anti-retaliation policy, said Paul Wright, Boeing’s senior director for safety management systems, during Wednesday’s hearing.
It has received “well over” 2,000 reports so far this year in its Speak Up system, a new anonymous channel to file concerns, he continued.
“What we want to see is employees reporting good-faith mistakes without reprisal,” Wright said. “It all comes down to employees feeling safe to report.”
Wright said Boeing now collects more information in Speak Up to respond more quickly to concerns.
Leaders of the Machinists union, which represents more than 30,000 Boeing workers, said they were not familiar with the updated anti-retaliation policy.
Lloyd Catlin, who is representing the Machinists at the NTSB hearing, told investigators Boeing’s changes to its safety and quality system all sound very good but “it’s not what it appears to be.”
Speak Up allows workers to remain anonymous. But Catlin said some workers are concerned that they will still be identified. Catlin said he’s heard some positive outcomes of Speak Up reports, but has also been stonewalled by Boeing through the system in the past.
Boeing is said to be working on a similar anonymous reporting system for its engineering workforce. Asked about the program Wednesday, Wright said he did not have an update.
Increasingly complex systems
Much of the questioning Wednesday related to policies and procedures meant to keep defective or incomplete planes from leaving Boeing plants.
Sabrina Woods, an aviation accident investigator with NTSB, questioned Boeing and Spirit about both companies’ quality and safety protocols.
“At what point should the error have been caught?” Woods asked Boeing and Spirit quality managers. “It’s not about whether the error should have happened in the first place. … Within your system, where should the error have been stopped in its tracks?”
A quality management system, or QMS, is a road map a company must follow to ensure it is meeting customer expectations. Boeing and Spirit are required by FAA regulation to have a QMS.
A safety management system, or SMS, is similar but focuses on product and workforce safety. Earlier this year, the FAA passed a rule to require companies that manufacture aircraft, aircraft engines or propellers to implement such a system by May 2027.
Boeing voluntarily created a SMS years before the misassembled 737 MAX left the Renton factory last fall. Spirit is expected to implement one in coming months.
On Wednesday, Woods asked executives from both companies if they were confident that the average factory worker knows how use either system.
Gregg Brown, Spirit’s senior vice president of global quality, said he was “confident that most mechanics know where they’re supposed to look.” Hector Silva, Boeing’s director of quality, said that was a “tough question to answer.”
During an FAA audit this spring, Boeing employees could not point to a QMS document when asked, Silva said. But when pressed, they were able to describe the company’s procedures.
The company has more than 400 documents that lay out its quality processes, with an additional 600 supplemental records, Silva said. Those documents are always changing, he continued, but the blowout forced Boeing to recognize how complex its system is and consider comprehensive changes.
Catlin, of the Machinists union, testified Wednesday that those changes are confusing for employees working on the floor. That’s partly because the changes come down to vernacular, using vocabulary that is already subjective.
“They have been through so many changes over the 10 years. It’s very ambiguous and open to misinterpretation,” Catlin said. “I don’t think the vast majority of our IAM members can define the difference between an inspection, verification and conformance decision.”
Silva said Boeing is aware it still has work to do. Continuous improvement is part of the nature of the system, he continued.
“But trying to change too many things too quickly can either lead to unintended consequences … or run the risk that they’re not implemented as fully or deeply as we need to,” he said.
Homendy unconvinced
Complicated or not, Boeing should have had the systems in place years ago to prevent mistakes that led to the blowout, NTSB Chair Homendy told reporters Wednesday.
Homendy said Boeing has so far made “everything sound rosy” during the hearing. But, she continued, if everything was working as it should “this accident should have never happened. This should have been caught years ago.”
In interviews over the course of the investigation, Homendy said there’s a “clear disconnect” between Boeing executives and front-line workers, and between Boeing and Spirit, which Boeing is working to acquire.
To Homendy, that disconnect points to a safety culture that is lacking.
“It sounds great on paper. In reality, that’s not what’s happening and it’s causing safety issues,” she said. “We’re concerned we’re going to be right here again in a couple of years.”
The NTSB will survey all employees at Boeing’s Renton factory, Homendy said, to get a better sense of that safety culture.
The hearing wrapped up Wednesday evening, hours before incoming Boeing CEO Kelly Ortberg was to take the helm Thursday morning. Toward the end of Wednesday’s panels, NTSB member Michael Graham asked witnesses what safety takeaways they would share with Ortberg.
“The importance of promoting, and leading by example, a strong safety culture to demonstrate trust, transparency and treatment,” remarked Silva, the Boeing quality director.
Machinists union representative Catlin: “We are all in this together and we all need a seat at the table if we want to make this work.”
Brian Knaup, FAA representative: “It is important that they ensure their people are … prepared to do the right thing when no one is looking for safety and the right thing when a manager is looking, for safety.”
As Ortberg settles in, the NTSB will continue its work analyzing the fruits of its investigation, now in its eighth month.
NTSB specialists will analyze the information gathered from field visits, thousands of pages of interviews and the testimony offered during the investigative hearing. They can also continue collecting information.
Investigations can take up to two years to complete. The agency determines probable cause for an incident but doesn’t assign fault or blame.
