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Opinion
The following is presented as part of The Columbian’s Opinion content, which offers a point of view in order to provoke thought and debate of civic issues. Opinions represent the viewpoint of the author. Unsigned editorials represent the consensus opinion of The Columbian’s editorial board, which operates independently of the news department.
News / Opinion / Columns

Will: Court may be taking more robust role

By George Will
Published: March 3, 2019, 6:01am

There have been many memorable — and eventually consequential — Supreme Court dissents that affirmed principles that, in time, commanded a court majority. It is, however, rare that a justice’s opinion concurring in a unanimous ruling is more intellectually scintillating and potentially portentous than the ruling itself. This happened recently, when the court dealt with an Indiana civil forfeiture case in which a man’s $42,000 Land Rover was seized by the state as part of his punishment for a drug offense (selling $225 of drugs) for which the maximum fine is $10,000.

In an excellent decision, the court held that the Constitution’s Eighth Amendment ban on “excessive fines” applies to states. The court has explicitly applied (“incorporated”) most of the Bill of Rights’ protections, piecemeal, against states’ actions. The court’s standard has been that a particular protection must be “deeply rooted” in the nation’s history and “fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty.” The court said that the Eighth Amendment’s proscription of excessive fines should be incorporated, as the amendment’s other two proscriptions (“excessive bail” and “cruel and unusual punishments”) have been.

The court has long relied on the doctrine of “substantive due process” — due process produces nonarbitrary outcomes — to protect rights. Ratified in 1868, the 14th Amendment’s protection of Americans’ “privileges or immunities” was written during the Southern suppression of the economic liberties and other rights of freed slaves. The clause was intended to protect the full panoply of national rights. But just five years later, the court construed the clause so narrowly (as protecting a few “national” rights, such as access to navigable waterways) as to nullify it.

What else would a revived Privileges or Immunities Clause protect? Certainly economic liberty, including the right to earn a living unburdened by unreasonable occupational licensure laws.

Richer menu of rights

In a one-paragraph concurrence, Justice Neil Gorsuch cited Yale law professor Akhil Amar’s book “The Bill of Rights,” in which Amar notes that if those who wrote and ratified the clause merely meant to apply against the states the Bill of Rights, they could, and presumably would, have said so. Hence it is reasonable to think that, properly construed, the clause denotes a richer menu of rights, encompassing those in Anglo-American legal traditions and state constitutions, and not ignoring the Ninth Amendment: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”

Justice Clarence Thomas, who correctly regards stare decisis — the principle of deciding cases by adhering to precedents — as less than sacramental, has for many years been 20 percent of a potential court majority for resuscitating the Privileges or Immunities Clause. With Gorsuch, who last week suggested that the privileges or immunities of U.S. citizens “include, at minimum, the individual rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights” (emphasis added), there would be 40 percent of such a majority. America might be moving closer to a more robust role for an engaged judiciary in protecting a more spacious conception of the rights attached to national citizenship.

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